September 27th, 2011
The European Heads of State and Government adopted replacing the European bailout package of 2013 changed the institutional quality of the Euro zone fundamental: It is a transfer union on the basis of a joint liability. Thus concludes the political class is an institutional arrangement for Europe, which she herself has in the period from the 1992 Maastricht treaty until a week ago as a taboo totally excluded.The ESM is a disaster for the future functioning of monetary union, because, as a transfer union fundamentally important incentives for recipient and donor countries to stability-oriented fiscal policy reversed reversed and thus the already – deteriorating failed structural elements of the European Monetary Union by a further incentive inefficient rotations – varied indicated.
We know from experience with financial compensation systems that they emit perverse incentives to donors and recipients, inviting both sides to less fiscal discipline and cut short the fundamental principle of stability of political responsibility. If the ESM does contain a certain automatism sanction for failure to meet the stability criteria, it does not yet, or only conditionally, because its automatic is still ultimately limited by discretionary policy decisions. As praised by the policy side, the sanctions-related sharpening the Stability Pact, which would now ensure the fiscal discipline of the members of the euro zone more than before, so we refer to the previous bad experiences with discretionary political decision-making in Europe: the sharper the stability criteria and penalties, the greater the tendency for its circumvention by political Diskretionarität to the violation of European law standards. For it to decide on sinners still sinners. So why change the future of the discipline of political stability essential non-compliance?
No doubt would be the introduction of the euro failed on public resistance when that time would have known that the financial system is now € imposed. The euro is indeed a story of suffering continually broken promises of politicians. It characterizes a way of increasing discrepancy between the political desiderata and absolutely necessary for their realization, but lack of economic conditions. She is the incarnation of politicians, credibility, currency of economic ignorance of the political class of Europe whose political opportunism, by a false understanding of European solidarity, of mantra-affinity alternatively free €-obsession.
This leads us to the following basic considerations that affect the final quality of the European integration process. A transnational transfer union, if it is to operate between economic and fiscal policy is highly heterogeneous countries, one of this heterogeneity corresponding duty of solidarity requires the donor to recipient countries. When in doubt, as we know, under the premise: No matter what it costs. Such a demanding transfer solidarity of donors to the contractors can work permanently probably only in a jurisdiction that corresponds to a state, apply where the with stronger nationalist than trans-national solidarity empathy equipped payers to recipients the required solidarity.
In a confederation or even – in the terminus of the Federal Constitutional Court on the classification of the current institutional quality of the EU – in the association of states can be according to experience one of the nation-solidary liability willingness corresponding transnational solidarity inclination of citizens produce little – even and especially not by hasty political decisions, the solidarity of the citizens of this costly me anything you demand nothing of Europe, so its largely unsuccessful political engineered € project but do not fail.