October 30th, 2010
Expected or hoped-for economic trends are being described with like letters. Most desirable is the V, and the deep crisis following the recovery from the bungy principle. The W describes the surprising decline after the rapid recovery, for example, when I run the monetary stimulus and ends flooding, followed by the hangover.A hesitant recovery after a prolonged crisis, describes the U. This is the worst Szeanrio L: The crisis is the gateway to the stagnation such as after the Great Depression or in Japan since the bursting of the bubble economy.
Looking back now on the growth prospects of China. Consumption and investment rise again. Stock and property prices shoot up. Thanks to an expansionary monetary and fiscal policy and monetary policy is stabilizing the global colossus safely through the storm arrives and accelerates again. In contrast, the U.S. reeling for U. The real growth in 2009 will be close to 0%. The IMF forecast for 2010 is a meager 2%. The image of the American growth model is tarnished. Unbridled financial markets, unrestrained consumption on credit and persistent current account deficits are being criticized. The effects of expansionary monetary and fiscal policy as crisis therapy are uncertain.
Goods market may view the rapid recovery in East Asia, the U.S. gives hope. Concerns come to the capital market, if one is going back to Japan and East Asia in the 90 years. There, the combination of U changed.
Runs every crisis and every known euphoria before the crisis differently, so that experiences from other countries and regions, no clear predictions are being made for the future. Yet there are parallels between Japan and Südostastasien today in the 1990s, the U.S. and China to give the thought. In the U.S., the economy is developing quickly turned for the better. The Economist, subtitled “Asia's Astonishing Rebound”. As in Japan and Southeast Asia in the first half of the 90s, it is concluded between the U.S. and East Asia with the growth engine of China to a combination of U and V, the starting point for a new boom-and-crisis cycle could be.
Central banks and governments in China and East Asia are expected today – unlike Japan and Southeast Asian countries in the '90s – known to be the risks associated with speculative capital inflows from large capital markets, low interest rates. The People's Bank of China is therefore in July of the monetary easing in response to the crisis moved away again. The credit volume is again tightened, and it starts a narrow tightrope walk between the joy of the anticipated expansion, and the fear of more speculative distortions.
Whether speculative China and his small East Asian neighbors to the dangers of capital inflows may also withdraw at high vigilance is questionable, the region has a promising future perspective. The workforce is young and motivated, low wage levels, the growth potential of consumption and investment in large and the welfare system lean. International capital is likely to react to these factors. But for countries with underdeveloped capital and product markets, strong capital inflows are a curse. Because the possibilities to control or absorb huge capital inflows are limited, so long as one does not want to isolate it by strict capital controls from world markets. Peoples Bank of China raised the interest rates to curb speculative waves, then additional capital will be attracted from the U.S. and seigt the probability of speculative bubbles.